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[675] 
Atlantic Marine and the Future of Party 
Preference 
Scott Dodson* 
In Atlantic Marine, the Supreme Court held that a prelitigation forum-selection 
agreement does not make an otherwise proper venue improper. Prominent civil 
procedure scholars have questioned the wisdom and accuracy of this holding. In this 
paper, I defend Atlantic Marine as essentially correct based on what I have elsewhere 
called the principle of party subordinance. I go further, however, to argue that the 
principle underlying Atlantic Marine could affect the widespread private market for 
prelitigation agreements, with significant commercial and doctrinal repercussions. 
 
 * Professor of Law and Harry & Lillian Hastings Research Chair, University of California 
Hastings College of the Law. I presented an early version of this paper at the civil procedure 
roundtable during the annual meeting of the Southeastern Association of Law Schools. Many thanks 
to those who commented on drafts. 
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Introduction 
Federal “venue” law prescribes which federal courts are proper to 
hear a particular civil lawsuit. What if parties want to select their own 
venue? Federal venue law allows challenges to improper venue to be 
waived or forfeited by the parties, meaning that if the parties wish to 
have their dispute litigated in an improper forum, then the procedural 
rules allow them to do so. If, for example, the venue statute prescribes 
only the Southern District of Texas and the Northern District of Texas as 
proper for a particular case, the parties can nevertheless have their case 
heard in the Eastern District of Texas if the plaintiff files there and the 
defendant forfeits or waives its challenge to improper venue. 
But what if the parties wish to restrict the range of lawful venues? In 
other words, what if the parties wish to restrict venue only to the 
Southern District of Texas, even though the law would allow the suit to 
proceed in the Northern District of Texas? In that case, the parties would 
typically codify their preference in a private contract specifying the sole 
venue for their dispute as the Southern District of Texas. Such restrictive 
forum-selection provisions are quite common in many contracts.1 
The lingering question is how a court should, if at all, enforce such 
law-altering private agreements. If the plaintiff, having agreed to the 
restrictive forum-selection clause, nevertheless sues the defendant in the 
 
 1. 14D Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3803.1 (4th ed. 2013) 
(“Contractual provisions purporting to govern where a suit may be brought are common. . . . Now they 
are nearly ubiquitous in all manner of contracts . . . .”); see also id. at n.1 (citing cases); David Marcus, 
The Perils of Contract Procedure: A Revised History of Forum Selection Clauses in the Federal 
Courts, 82 Tul. L. Rev. 973, 975 (2008) (“The forum selection clause . . . is among the most important 
and pervasive types of contract procedure.”). 
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Northern District of Texas, should the court dismiss the case? Transfer 
the case to the Southern District? Do nothing? Under what authority 
and under what standards? 
The Supreme Court answered these questions in Atlantic Marine 
Construction Co. v. U.S. District Court.2 It held that a restrictive forum-
selection clause may be enforced by a court at the insistence of the 
defendant not by dismissal or transfer for improper venue, but rather 
under the federal venue statute that allows transfer from one proper 
venue to another proper venue for the convenience of the parties and 
witnesses and in the interests of justice.3 
In the immediate wake of the decision, some questioned the 
accuracy and wisdom of the Court’s holding, and a prominent scholar’s 
brief urging dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)—rather than transfer—
received some play at oral argument.4 Few have stood up for the 
decision. 
I rise to the challenge. Atlantic Marine was, in the main, rightly 
decided. A restrictive forum-selection clause does not make a proper venue 
improper. The reason, as I will explain, is that private agreements cannot 
trump the law. More fundamentally, party preferences are subordinate to 
legal directives. If those legal directives do not incorporate party choice, 
then party choice is largely unenforceable in court, except through 
recourse to a standard breach of contract action.5 
The Court’s decision implicitly, though inconsistently, endorses the 
principle of party subordinance. However, that principle has far broader 
implications than perhaps the Court recognized, both for venue and for 
other doctrines, such as personal jurisdiction and jury trial waivers. The 
principle also creates tension with the recent push for more 
customization of litigation in a variety of litigation procedures, from 
restrictions on relief sought to differing limitations periods. It seems 
unlikely the Court meant to open such a can of worms. 
This Article views Atlantic Marine and the future of party preference 
through this lens. Part I analyzes the opinion and the alternatives 
presented by its critics. Part II defends the opinion as (mostly) faithful to 
the principle of party subordinance. Part III explores the wider 
implications of adherence to the principle within and beyond venue 
selection. 
 
 2. 134 S. Ct. 568 (2013). 
 3. Id. at 575. 
 4. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 12–16, Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. 568 (No. 12-929) (reflecting 
the Court’s interest with the theory of Professor Stephen Sachs). 
 5. See Scott Dodson, Party Subordinance in Federal Litigation, 83 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, 23–24 
(2014).  
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I.  ATLANTIC MARINE and Its Critics 
A. The Decision 
Atlantic Marine Construction Co., a Virginia corporation with its 
principal place of business in Virginia, contracted with the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers to build a child development center in the Western 
District of Texas. Atlantic Marine then entered into a subcontract with J-
Crew Management, Inc., a Texas corporation.6 The subcontract specified 
that all disputes between the parties “shall be litigated in the Circuit 
Court for the City of Norfolk, Virginia, or the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Norfolk Division.”7 
A dispute arose, and J-Crew sued Atlantic Marine in the Western 
District of Texas on diversity jurisdiction grounds.8 Venue undeniably 
was proper in the Western District of Texas under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) 
because the subcontract was entered into and performed in that district.9 
Nevertheless, Atlantic Marine argued that the forum-selection provision 
rendered the Western District of Texas wrong or improper and moved to 
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).10 In the alternative, 
Atlantic Marine sought to transfer the case to the Eastern District of 
Virginia under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) for the convenience of the parties and 
witnesses and in the interests of justice.11 The lower courts denied the 
motions, and Atlantic Marine sought review in the Supreme Court.12 
The Court unanimously reversed. “Whether venue is ‘wrong’ or 
‘improper,’” the Court reasoned, “depends exclusively on whether the 
court in which the case was brought satisfies the requirements of federal 
venue laws, and those provisions say nothing about a forum-selection 
clause.”13 Noting that the proper-venue statute “shall govern . . . all civil 
actions,” and noting that the statute specified only exceptions “provided 
by law,”14 the Court concluded that “[w]hether the parties entered into a 
contract containing a forum-selection clause has no bearing on whether a 
case falls into one of the categories of cases listed in § 1391(b).”15 And, if 
the case falls into one of those categories, “venue is proper; if it does not, 
venue is improper.”16 
 
 6. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 575. 
 7. Id.  
 8. Id. at 576. 
 9. Id. at 576 n.1. 
 10. Id. at 576.  
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 576–77. 
 13. Id. at 577.  
 14. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1) (2006)). 
 15. Id. at 577. 
 16. Id. 
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The Court also reasoned that the structure of the venue statutes 
“confirms that they alone define whether venue exists.”17 In particular, 
the Court noted that the statutes manifest an intent to afford proper 
venue somewhere.18 Yet, the Court surmised, a forum-selection 
provision that specified a state or foreign court to the exclusion of all 
federal courts could frustrate that intent.19 
Finally, the Court considered Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh 
Corp.,20 in which the Court indicated that a federal court could use 
§ 1404(a) to enforce a forum-selection clause.21 Acknowledging that 
Stewart did not decide that § 1404(a) was the only way for a federal court 
to enforce a forum-selection clause, Atlantic Marine nevertheless 
pointed to dictum in Stewart that seemed to approve the denial of a 
motion to dismiss for improper venue in that case.22 For all these reasons, 
the Court in Atlantic Marine held that “a forum-selection clause does 
not render venue in a court ‘wrong’ or ‘improper’ within the meaning of 
§ 1406(a) or Rule 12(b)(3).”23 
Instead, the Court held, the proper enforcement vehicle is venue 
transfer under § 1404(a).24 That venue provision allows transfer from one 
proper venue to another proper (or consented) venue for the convenience 
of the parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice.25 
The Court then articulated the proper standard for a district court to 
use when transferring under a forum-selection clause and § 1404(a): 
“Only under extraordinary circumstances unrelated to the convenience 
of the parties should a § 1404(a) motion [based on a valid forum-
selection clause] be denied.”26 Because the forum-selection clause 
represents the parties’ agreement about the most proper forum and the 
parties’ legitimate expectations about where the suit will be litigated, the 
Court reasoned, a court considering a § 1404(a) transfer based on a 
restrictive forum-selection clause must treat all private interests as 
weighing in favor of transfer, and instead consider only whether the 
 
 17. Id. at 578. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. (“That would not comport with the statute’s design, which contemplates that venue will 
always exist in some federal court.”). 
 20. 487 U.S. 22 (1988). 
 21. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 579 (citing Stewart, 487 U.S. at 32). 
 22. Id. (citing Stewart, 487 U.S. at 28 n.8). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012) (“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of 
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have 
been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented.”). 
 26. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581. 
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plaintiff has met its burden of showing that public interest factors defeat 
transfer.27 
B. Critics and Their Alternatives 
The proper enforcement mechanism for forum-selection clauses has 
been debated for some time.28 The Second Circuit recently proclaimed 
that it has, at various times, upheld enforcement via dismissal under Rule 
12(b)(1) (for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction), Rule 12(b)(3) (for 
improper venue), and Rule 12(b)(6) (for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted).29 
Of these, Rule 12(b)(3) seems the most promising. The idea is 
simply that a restrictive forum-selection clause makes an otherwise proper 
venue “improper” under Rule 12(b)(3), or “wrong” under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1406(a). Atlantic Marine urged this argument,30 and it had several 
circuits on its side, including the Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, 
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits.31 Further, after the Court issued its opinion, 
several academic luminaries questioned why the Court did not decide the 
case under Rule 12(b)(3) or § 1406(a).32 
Alternatively, a few circuits have employed dismissal under Rule 
12(b)(6) to enforce a restrictive forum-selection clause.33 Professor Stephen 
Sachs championed this argument in an important amicus brief filed in the 
 
 27. Id. at 582 n.6. Interestingly, the Court also stated that the transferee court should apply its own 
choice-of-law rules when receiving a case transferred under a forum-selection clause. Id. at 582–83. 
 28. See generally Marcus, supra note 1. 
 29. TradeComet.com LLC v. Google, Inc., 647 F.3d 472, 478–79 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 30. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 577. 
 31. See, e.g., Estate of Myhra v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1233, 1238 (11th Cir. 
2012); Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 552 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2009); Martin v. Ball, 326 F. App’x. 191 (4th 
Cir. 2009); Auto. Mechanics Local 701 Welfare & Pension Funds v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., 
502 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2007); Commerce Consultants Int’l, Inc. v. Vetrerie Riunite, S.p.A., 867 F.2d 697 
(D.C. Cir. 1989); see also 14D Wright et al., supra note 1, § 3803.1 (citing cases). 
 32. See Allan Ides & Simona Grossi, Supreme Court Update, Civ. Proc. Sec. Newsl. (Ass’n of 
Am. Law Schs.), Fall 2013, at 5 (questioning the Court’s use of § 1404 and rejection of § 1406); Posting 
of Simona Grossi, simona.grossi@lls.edu, to civ-pro@listserv.nd.edu (Dec. 5, 2013) (on file with 
author) (“I agree with Professor Clermont that the better solution would have been to use § 1406. 
Assuming the validity and enforceability of an exclusive [forum-selection clause], venues other than 
the selected one should be treated as wrong venues.”); cf. Posting of Linda Silberman, 
linda.silberman@nyu.edu, to civ-pro@listserv.nd.edu (Dec. 3, 2013) (on file with author) (“I was 
somewhat surprised the Court did not address the problem through 1406. I realize that the Court says 
venue is proper in the case, but given a choice of forum clause one might think such a clause divests the 
‘wrong’ forum of personal jurisdiction.”). But see Brief of Professor Stephen E. Sachs as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of Neither Party at 2, Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. 568 (No. 12-929) [hereinafter “Sachs Brief”] 
(“Forum-selection clauses have no effect on venue, which is defined by statute. While parties can waive 
their venue objections in advance, they cannot destroy proper venue by private agreement.”). 
 33. TradeComet.com, 647 F.3d at 478–79; Rivera v. Centro Medico de Turabo, Inc., 575 F.3d 10, 
15 (1st Cir. 2009); see also 14D Wright et al., supra note 1, § 3829 n.17 (citing cases from the First and 
Third Circuits). 
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case.34 In its opinion, the Court briefly noted the argument, but, because 
neither party moved under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court declined to decide 
whether Rule 12(b)(6) was a proper vehicle for enforcing a restrictive 
forum-selection clause.35 
II.  Defending the Court 
In this Part, I defend the Court’s decision as faithful to the principle 
of party subordinance. 
A. Party Subordinance 
One can visualize in various hierarchical ways the struggle among 
parties, courts, and the law to control the litigation. One vision might put 
parties on top, with the law and courts subject to their whims, as Figure 1 
shows. 
Figure 1: Party Dominance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Under this vision, parties control both the law and the courts. Thus, 
if parties wish to prescribe their own limitations period, they can do so by 
private contract, and, if enforceable, their agreement will supersede the 
law. And, because the law dominates over courts, the parties’ privately 
agreed limitations period—now with force of law—binds the courts. 
Further, parties can exercise control over courts directly by waiving or 
forfeiting claims, defenses, facts, arguments, or other issues, and courts 
have no power to override those party choices. 
The absolute and rigid version of Figure 1 is untenable under 
current doctrine because settled exceptions, such as that of federal 
subject matter jurisdiction, inherent powers, and the like, prevent parties 
 
 34. See generally Sachs Brief, supra note 32. 
 35. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 580. 
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from exercising unfettered control. But the principle that it represents—a 
principle of party dominance and control—is common even in a less 
absolutist form. Federal courts routinely “enforce” both ex ante 
agreements altering otherwise applicable law and ex post litigation 
conduct such as waiver and forfeiture.36 
Indeed, before Atlantic Marine, most federal courts enforced 
restrictive forum-selection clauses under Figure 1’s model. They 
reasoned that a restrictive forum-selection clause effectively rendered 
otherwise proper venues improper.37 Those courts thus enforced the 
clause via a motion to dismiss for improper venue (or sometimes for 
failure to state a claim).38 
Figure 1’s model of party dominance is not the only model for 
organizing these relationships.39 Figure 2 below presents a rotated vision 
based upon a principle of party subordinance: 
Figure 2: Party Subordinance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Under this model, parties are beholden both to the law and to 
courts. Parties (and courts) may not do what the law forbids, and their 
attempts to alter the law are void. Further, parties cannot control courts; 
courts are free to disregard party choices such as waiver, forfeiture, and 
consent, as long as that discretion is not cabined by law. 
Elsewhere, I have defended Figure 2’s model as required to 
preserve the public nature of the federal civil litigation system and in the 
 
 36. Dodson, supra note 5, at 20, 36–37, 40, 54. 
 37. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 987 (“A contractually valid clause can displace [venue rules] as 
defaults around which parties can bargain.”). 
 38. 5B Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 1352 nn.4–5 (3d ed. 
2004) (citing cases). 
 39. Professor David Marcus has articulated a model that appears to put courts on top. He 
believes courts have discretion to enforce procedural contracts, and that judicial discretion is informed 
by the presence of “extraindividual” interests. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 1042–43. 
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governmental nature of the federal judiciary.40 Federal courts offer a 
neutral, formal, governmental adjudicative system, subsidized by taxes, 
constrained by public law, and offering public goods.41 Accordingly, 
federal courts are subject to the legal system as established by a 
republican society, not to the whims of individual parties.42 If parties 
wish to litigate differently, they are free to choose private forms of 
dispute resolution that reflect the organization of Figure 1 and present 
no governmental problem of private customization. 
The model of party subordinance in Figure 2 has an additional 
advantage over the model of party dominance illustrated in Figure 1: the 
model of party subordinance is absolute and free from exceptions. It is 
true that, in rare instances, parties can exercise choices such as waiver, 
forfeiture, consent, stipulation, and agreement, and those choices do bind 
courts. Venue law, for example, allows parties to consent to a particular 
venue, and the law then denies judges the authority to decline transfer to 
that consented venue solely on the ground that the consented venue is 
improper.43 But those instances are not exceptions requiring reversal of 
the arrow pointing from courts to parties. The reason is that, in those 
instances, party choice becomes law. Party choice cannot control courts 
unilaterally. But if the law incorporates party choice, then courts must 
follow it because of the arrow pointing from law to courts. The law is 
supreme: If it wishes, it can elevate party choice to the status of law, 
which then will control courts. 
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) is a good example of 
incorporation. That statute “expressly subordinates judicial power to 
party agreements to arbitrate.”44 Further, the FAA provides a specific 
mechanism for judicial enforcement of valid arbitration agreements.45 
The FAA is consistent with Figure 2 because law’s position of dominance 
permits the FAA to enable party agreement to control the courts. This 
feature of the FAA is a rarity, however; most party agreements and 
contractual provisions lack such legal sanction. 
It is also true that parties purport to control courts with their choices 
even absent legal incorporation. In other words, even when the law does 
not essentially elevate party choice to the status of law, the law may 
allow party choice. And courts generally defer to those choices. But 
those choices do not bind courts. They are lawful choices (in other words, 
they do not offend the arrow pointing from law to parties), but they do 
 
 40. Dodson, supra note 5, at 13. 
 41. Id. at 13–14. 
 42. Id. at 14 n.52. 
 43. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012) (stating that transfer may be “to any district or division to which all 
parties have consented”). 
 44. Dodson, supra note 5, at 17–18. 
 45. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2015). 
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not affect the arrow pointing from courts to parties. Rather, courts have 
discretion whether to defer to such party choices. For example, a 
defendant can forfeit a limitations defense by failing or refusing to move 
for dismissal or judgment on that basis. That forfeiture may disable the 
defendant from raising the issue later, but it generally does not disable 
the court from raising the issue. To the contrary, courts retain full 
discretion, consistent with statute, to raise waived or forfeited issues and 
even dispose of cases on their grounds.46 Of course, the wise court may 
defer to party choice and not raise such issues, but that deference is 
simply by the grace of the court and not because party choice disables 
it.47 
B. The Court’s Reasoning 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Atlantic Marine follows the 
Figure 2 mold, for the most part. It rejects the Figure 1 idea that the 
parties can change the law of venue by private agreement to make an 
otherwise proper venue improper, and instead it adopts the Figure 2 idea 
that the law controls the parties’ venue preferences.48 
Further, the opinion accepts the Figure 2 premise that the law could 
incorporate party choice. It engages a rather elaborate statutory analysis 
of whether venue law incorporates restrictive forum-selection clauses49 
and ultimately concludes that venue law does incorporate, in a way, party 
preferences.50 Venue law does so through 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which 
allows venue transfer for convenience and in the interests of justice, 
factors that are informed by private forum-selection clauses.51 
Atlantic Marine, therefore, is a small triumph for the party-
subordinance model illustrated in Figure 2. But several parts of the 
opinion suggest that the Court is wary about wholesale adoption of the 
principle. For example, the opinion does not rely on first principles to 
generate a general theory of party subordinance and then deductively 
reason that it applies to venue law. Instead, the opinion focuses on the 
particular statutory language of venue law in a way that could be 
interpreted as confining its analysis to venue law alone. 
 
 46. Dodson, supra note 5, at 29–30. 
 47. Id. at 30. 
 48. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 577 (2013) (“Whether venue is 
‘wrong’ or ‘improper’ depends exclusively on whether the court in which the case was brought satisfies 
the requirements of federal venue laws . . . .”); id. (“When venue is challenged, the court must 
determine whether the case falls within one of the three categories set out in § 1391(b). If it does, 
venue is proper; if it does not, venue is improper . . . . Whether the parties entered into a contract 
containing a forum-selection clause has no bearing  . . . .”). 
 49. Id. at 577–79. 
 50. Id. at 579. 
 51. Id. 
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Additionally, the Court’s incorporation of restrictive forum-selection 
clauses as an automatic proxy for the “convenience of the parties and 
witnesses” test of § 1404(a)52 seems so stretched as to approach the 
party-dominance model of Figure 1. Unlike the express incorporation of 
party agreements elsewhere in § 1404(a) and § 1404(b),53 the 
“convenience of the parties” language does not obviously incorporate 
party agreement or consent. Further, one can easily imagine a host of 
scenarios in which the conveniences of the parties are not accurately 
reflected by a particular agreement, especially if the agreement is a 
bargained-for sacrifice by one party in exchange for other terms. Even if 
an agreement did accurately reflect the conveniences of the parties at 
one time, it may not by the time a lawsuit commences. It is in the nature 
of a modern transient society that people move and circumstances 
change. The most that can be said about the “convenience of the parties” 
language is that it allows forum-selection clauses to be probative of the 
parties’ conveniences. The Court’s more reaching interpretation of the 
statutory language to mean dispositive evidence is so tenuous that it risks 
displacing the statutory test with the parties’ agreement in a way 
consonant with Figure 1.54 
Finally, the Court’s position that the transferee court receiving a 
case transferred under § 1404(a) via a forum-selection clause should 
apply choice-of-law rules as if no transfer occurred is identical to a § 1406 
transfer.55 Although, most plausibly, this holding is simply a product of the 
Supreme Court’s federal common law power to craft nonconstitutional 
choice-of-law rules for the federal courts, it is also consistent with the 
idea that a transfer based on a forum-selection clause falls under § 1406. 
Thus, it remains to be seen whether Atlantic Marine presages 
broader adoption of the principle of party subordinance or whether 
Atlantic Marine means to create yet another kind of exception to a 
model of party dominance. 
C. A Note About Rule 12(b)(6) 
The Court ducked Professor Sachs’ question of whether a forum-
selection clause could be enforced under Rule 12(b)(6) (or Rule 12(c) or 
Rule 56).56 But it is worth considering in light of the model of party 
subordinance. 
 
 52. Id. at 581 (“Only under extraordinary circumstances unrelated to the convenience of the 
parties should a § 1404(a) motion [based on a valid forum-selection clause] be denied.”). 
 53. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(b) (2012) (“Upon motion, consent or stipulation of all parties, any 
action, suit or proceeding of a civil nature or any motion or hearing thereof, may be transferred, in the 
discretion of the court, from the division in which pending to any other division in the same district.”). 
 54. I am grateful to Ingrid Wuerth for pushing me on these points. 
 55. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. My thanks to Rocky Rhodes for voicing this point. 
 56. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 580. 
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The model of party subordinance positions the law at the apex. 
Accordingly, if the substantive law of the claim treats a forum-selection 
clause as extinguishing the claim outside of the designated court,57 then 
the forum-selection clause becomes substantive law and could be 
enforceable under merits motions made under Rule 12(b)(6), Rule 12(c), 
Rule 56, and the like. Importantly, the “waiver,” “release,” or “defense” 
that arises from the forum-selection clause would have to be created by 
the substantive law rather than by the forum-selection clause. In other 
words, the substantive law would have to allow the parties to fashion 
such forum-based limitations on the claim. Substantive liability restrictions 
are not unusual; time-limitations periods, for example, are ubiquitous. 
But nonjurisdictional, forum-based limitations are rare and would create 
tension with Supreme Court precedent in some odd ways.58 Nevertheless, 
nonjurisdictional, forum-based limitations on the substantive law could 
exist59 and would control if not preempted or otherwise unlawful. 
The substantive claim at issue in Atlantic Marine, however, does not 
appear to specifically incorporate the effects of a private forum-selection 
clause. Accordingly, the merits-based mechanisms noted by the Court 
were not viable alternatives in practice, and therefore the Court was right 
to eschew them without a clearer indication of incorporation. 
III.  Implications 
This Part considers the implications of Atlantic Marine and the 
principle of party subordinance for venue and beyond. 
A. For Venue 
If Atlantic Marine represents endorsement of the principle of party 
subordinance of Figure 2 for restrictive forum-selection clauses, then it 
should affect the enforcement of permissive forum-selection clauses as 
well. If, for example, restrictive forum-selection clauses do not change 
 
 57. Sachs Brief, supra note 32, at 2 (“If the clause is valid and enforceable, it waives the plaintiff’s 
right to sue in an excluded forum, offering the defendant an affirmative defense to liability in that 
forum and the right to have the suit dismissed [under 12(b)(6), 12(c), or 56].”). But see Marcus, supra 
note 1, at 1033 (“Procedural mechanisms like Rule 12(b) were not designed as tools for enforcement 
of contracts for procedure.”). 
 58. For example, Atlantic Marine was clear that the doctrine of forum non conveniens could be 
used to enforce a forum-selection clause that specified only nonfederal forums. See Atl. Marine, 134 
S. Ct. at 580. Yet the Court has held the doctrine of forum non conveniens to be purely procedural and 
not merits based. See id. (citing Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 432 
(2007)). If forum non conveniens and venue transfer are non-merits based, then they fit uncomfortably 
within a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, to say nothing of a Rule 12(c) or Rule 56 judgment. 
 59. In some ways, the Federal Arbitration Act is a useful analogue. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2015) 
(creating a specific procedure for enforcing valid arbitration agreements). For a different context, see 
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010) (recognizing that a class 
action bar could apply in state court even if it could not apply in federal court). 
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venue law unless the law incorporates the clause, then permissive forum-
selection clauses also do not change venue law unless the law incorporates 
the clause. Section 1391 no more allows parties to privately broaden the 
scope of proper venue than it allows parties to privately narrow the 
scope.60 Thus, permissive forum-selection clauses are just as ineffective as 
restrictive forum-selection clauses. 
It is true that the procedural law permits parties to waive or forfeit 
their venue objections. But the law affords parties this choice through the 
specific mechanism of Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 12(b)(3) gives parties the right to challenge improper venue, but 
that right must be exercised by timely motion.61 Accordingly, defendants 
may waive or forfeit objections to improper venue by failing to raise 
those objections in a timely motion under Rule 12(b)(3). 
But neither a Federal Rule nor § 1391 says anything about ex ante 
waiver of venue objections through a permissive forum-selection 
clause.62 Consequently, a permissive forum-selection agreement is merely 
a private contract by the parties, in which each party promises to waive 
objections to that venue using the ex post mechanism established by 
Rule 12. Failure to abide by that promise may give rise to a breach of 
contract claim under state law, but it does not somehow make the 
improper venue proper or deprive the defendant’s ability to file a 
meritorious Rule 12(b)(3) motion for improper venue. Indeed, outside of 
a separate breach of contract action seeking the remedy of specific 
performance, such an ex ante agreement is unenforceable by a federal 
court. 
Of course, commitment to the principle of law’s dominance reflected 
in Figure 2 means that the law could allow parties to waive their venue 
objections in advance. But aside from § 1404(a), which allows transfer to 
an otherwise improper venue that has been consented to by the parties, 
no codified law appears to allow ex ante waiver. Perhaps some federal 
common law principle extends to permissive forum-selection clauses, but 
that would be a complicated analysis indeed, particularly for diversity 
cases like Atlantic Marine.63 Commitment to the principle of party 
 
 60. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2012). 
 61. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3). 
 62. Indeed, surely all would agree that a permissive forum-selection clause does not waive all 
right to challenge improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3), such as if the case is filed in a venue allowed 
by neither private agreement nor § 1391. 
 63. Federal common law is more prevalent and justified in admiralty, where forum-selection 
clauses have taken hold. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991); The Bremen v. 
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). It is therefore quite disturbing that a number of courts have 
extended admiralty doctrine’s treatment of forum-selection clauses to the diversity context. See 
14D Wright et al., supra note 1, § 3803.1 n.14 (citing cases). 
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subordinance, then, should demand skepticism of the facile assertion that 
parties can waive venue objections in advance.64 
B. And Beyond 
There seems little reason to restrict the principle of party subordinance 
to venue. If Atlantic Marine subordinates parties’ venue preferences to 
codified venue law, then Atlantic Marine supports the subordination of 
other party preferences as well. Parties today purport to exert domineering 
private choice in a variety of contexts, including jury waiver, personal 
jurisdiction, choice of law, limitations deadlines, class-action waivers, and 
discovery. Atlantic Marine properly calls all of these into question. 
How might party subordination work in these areas? This article will 
tackle just one that is useful for illustrative purposes: limitations periods.65 
Say two commercial entities enter into a contract that specifies that 
any lawsuit between them shall be filed no more than four years after the 
claim accrues. A dispute occurs and gives rise to a claim. Under the law, 
the limitations period of the claim is two years. Say the plaintiff then files 
suit on the claim three years after the claim accrues. The timeline looks 
like this: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The defendant moves to dismiss (or for judgment on) the claim based 
on the expiration of the legal limitations period. The plaintiff opposes the 
motion on the ground that the lawsuit was timely under the contract. 
What result? 
Under a model of party subordinance consistent with Atlantic 
Marine, the court must grant the motion because the plaintiff’s suit is 
untimely under the law. The contract neither alters the legal limitations 
period nor binds the court—assuming, of course, that the underlying 
limitations law does not itself incorporate party modifications. It is as if 
Box 4 above does not exist (at least in the eyes of the law and the court). 
The court has no discretion here; it must dismiss because the only legal 
authority (Box 2) demands it. 
 
 64. For such an assertion, see Sachs Brief, supra note 32, at 2; N.W. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 
916 F.2d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.) (“[S]ince a defendant is deemed to waive (that is, he 
forfeits) objections to personal jurisdiction or venue simply by not making them in timely fashion, a 
potential defendant can waive such objections in advance of suit by signing a forum selection clause.”). 
 65. For a discussion of the others, see Dodson, supra note 5, at 36–38. 
 1 
Claim 
Accrues 
2 
Claim 
SOL 
3 
Suit 
Filed 
4 
Contract 
SOL 
Dodson-66.3.doc (Do Not Delete) 3/23/2015 5:09 PM 
April 2015]     FUTURE OF PARTY PREFERENCE 689 
Now, a wrinkle: say the defendant fails to move to dismiss (or for 
judgment) on limitations grounds. During discovery, the court realizes 
that a limitations issue exists. Can the court enter judgment against the 
plaintiff sua sponte? 
Under the theory of party subordinance, the answer is that the court 
has the power to enter judgment but is unlikely to do so. This answer has 
three steps. The first is that, as stated above, the lawsuit is legally 
untimely because the contract does not change the law. The second step, 
illustrated in Figure 2, is that just as the parties’ ex ante contract does not 
alter the limitations period, neither does the defendant’s failure to raise 
it. The defendant may have disabled itself from raising the issue as a 
procedural matter, but the defendant’s conduct does not affect the court 
(unless the law somehow empowers such conduct to bind the court). 
Thus, despite the defendant’s ex post failure to raise the issue, the court 
continues to have the power to recognize and enforce the time 
limitations set forth by law. 
The third step, however, is whether the court should do so. Here is 
where Box 4 suddenly matters: Box 4 ought to influence the exercise of 
the court’s discretion to raise an issue forfeited by the parties. Although 
the court has the power to ignore the defendant’s ex post failure to raise 
the limitations issue, the court should consider that the defendant’s ex 
post conduct is consistent with the ex ante commitments of both parties. 
Clearly, both parties believe and wish the lawsuit to be considered 
timely. In a typical commercial dispute involving primarily private 
interests, it is unlikely that the court could find justification to override 
such party preferences. To be clear, the court could override those 
preferences, but sound discretion would counsel against it. 
Now change the hypothetical such that the law provides for a four-
year limitations period but the contract provides for a two-year 
limitations period. Switching Boxes 2 and 4, the timeline now looks like 
this: 
 
 
 
The defendant moves to dismiss (or for judgment on) the claim 
based on the expiration of the contractual limitations period. The plaintiff 
opposes the motion on the ground that the lawsuit was timely under the 
law. What result? 
Of course, the law controls. The contract does not shorten the legal 
limitations period. It is as if Box 2 does not exist. Therefore, the law is 
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timely and the motion must be denied. The court has no discretion to do 
otherwise. 
What if the defendant fails to move? Here, the answer is that the 
court may not dismiss (or enter judgment) on limitations grounds. The 
court has discretion to raise a limitations issue that a defendant waives or 
forfeits, but consideration of the issue has a clear and definitive answer. 
Unlike in the first hypothetical, here the claim is timely under the law, 
and so the motion must be denied. Box 2 is truly irrelevant to the 
litigation. 
It is worth emphasizing, however, that the contract is not irrelevant 
as to the parties. Parties can enter into contracts that carry penalties for 
breach under standard breach of contract actions. Box 2 may be irrelevant 
to this litigation, but it would be highly relevant to a subsequent breach 
of contract action that the defendant may file against the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff has breached the contract by filing a lawsuit at a time prohibited 
by her agreement. She therefore could be liable to the defendant in a 
separate breach of contract action. 
C. Commercial Effects 
I acknowledge the serious normative and practical implications of 
pervasive party subordinance. Party subordinance drastically reduces the 
power of parties to customize and control their litigation. They cannot 
change the law, and even when the law allows them to make choices, 
courts retain the power to override or disregard those choices. This 
disempowerment disrupts the certainty and predictability that may 
facilitate commercial arrangements, erodes litigant autonomy, burdens 
courts with issues the parties would prefer not to litigate for cost or 
strategic reasons, and risks siphoning cases into arbitration and out of the 
public courts entirely.66 
However compelling, these concerns are the faults of a rigidly 
independent public legal system that benefits from them in other, 
significant ways.67 Further, these concerns can be mitigated on their own 
terms. Congress and rulemakers can change the law to empower party 
choice and give parties control over courts, as with the FAA. For lawful 
ex post choices, the practical effects of judicial override may be so 
normatively distasteful as to be dispositive in the exercise of judicial 
discretion to defer to those choices. As an additional safeguard, party 
agreements are enforceable through breach-of-contract actions, which 
parties can bolster through liquidated damages clauses or indemnification 
provisions. Finally, if the risks of the public system prove too great, 
parties can always opt for a private adjudication system that allows for 
 
 66. Id. at 43–46. 
 67. See id. at 13–15 (describing the public benefits of court autonomy and independence). 
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greater control and customization. These mitigations are not panaceas, 
but they ought to be ameliorative. 
Conclusion 
I do not pretend that the Court considered all of these implications 
in Atlantic Marine. Far more likely, the Court was focused on the 
particular statutory regime of venue. As I have indicated, that statutory 
regime offers a way to limit Atlantic Marine to the venue context, and 
perhaps the Court will, in later cases, so confine Atlantic Marine. 
But the better view, in my judgment, would allow the principle of 
party subordinance in Atlantic Marine to broaden beyond venue. 
Figure 2 is simple, internally consistent, and protective of public court 
values, while still allowing room for accommodation of private values. 
The main difference between Figure 1 and Figure 2 is that Figure 2 
lodges the authority for those accommodations in the public actors—the 
law and the courts—rather than the parties. But that, I believe, is the way 
it should be in the public courts. 
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